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EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN
WASHINGTON STATE
Andrew Murphy* and Laura Zanzig**
Abstract: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires plaintiffs to
exhaust all available administrative appeals before challenging an agency’s action in court.
Washington courts describe exhaustion requirements, thresholds, and exceptions with varying
degrees of consistency and frequent muddled overlap. Despite the fact that administrative
exhaustion widely impacts Washington litigants, the secondary literature on the topic is fairly
sparse. And, given the doctrine’s confusing and harsh nature, it can bar judicial review of valid
claims. This article aims to address both of these issues. First, we offer a comprehensive review
of the doctrine as it currently stands, with the intent of assisting Washington lawyers navigating
this tricky area of law. Second, we propose that Washington courts protect valid claims and
preserve the integrity of administrative processes by equitably tolling the statute of limitations
while a plaintiff pursues administrative remedies.
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INTRODUCTION
The administrative exhaustion doctrine is well established in
Washington.1 The doctrine generally requires a plaintiff to exhaust all
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review.2 Substantial
policy interests produce a strong bias in favor of the exhaustion doctrine.
* Litigation attorney, Hillis Clark Martin & Peterson P.S.; J.D., University of Washington School
of Law, Class of 2013.
** Law Clerk to the Honorable John C. Coughenour, United States District Court, Western District
of Washington (2015–present); Law Clerk to the Honorable Marlin J. Appelwick, Washington State
Court of Appeals, Division One (2013–2015); J.D., University of Washington School of Law, Class
of 2013. Both authors are grateful to Michael Scott and Mary Crego Peterson for their thoughtful
influence on this article.
1. S. Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass’n for Pres. of Neighborhood Safety & Env’t v. King Cty., 101
Wash. 2d 68, 73, 677 P.2d 114, 117 (1984).
2. Id.
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Exhaustion: (1) prevents premature interruption of the administrative
process; (2) allows the agency to develop the factual background
necessary for its decision; (3) allows the agency to exercise its expertise;
(4) provides a more efficient process; (5) protects agency autonomy by
allowing it to correct its own errors; and (6) protects agency autonomy by
ensuring individuals are not encouraged to ignore agency procedure by
resorting to the courts.3
However, not every claim is subject to the exhaustion requirement;
rather, there are certain conditions precedent that must be satisfied before
the requirement attaches.4 In other words, if any condition precedent is
absent, exhaustion is not required. Even where the requirement attaches
to a claim, a plaintiff may also be excused for failing to exhaust
administrative remedies if the court finds that an exception applies.5
Specifically, courts may excuse the failure to exhaust administrative
remedies if fairness and practicality outweigh exhaustion’s substantial
policy interests.6
I.

EXHAUSTION DOES NOT APPLY TO A CLAIM UNLESS
FOUR CONDITIONS PRECEDENT ARE SATISFIED

Exhaustion applies:
(1) when a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an agency
alone; (2) when the agency’s authority establishes clearly defined
machinery for the submission, evaluation and resolution of
complaints by aggrieved parties; and (3) when the relief
sought . . . can be obtained by resort to an exclusive or adequate
administrative remedy.7
Said another way, these conditions precedent excuse the failure to exhaust
when an agency lacks jurisdiction over the claim, lacks clear review
procedures, or cannot provide any requested relief. And, if any of these
conditions precedent is absent, the agency cannot issue a final, appealable
order. As explained below, final, appealable orders have additional
requirements, and there is no obligation to exhaust unless the agency
issues a final, appealable order.8
3. Id. at 73–74, 677 P.2d at 118.
4. See id. at 73, 677 P.2d at 117–18.
5. See id. at 74, 677 P.2d at 118.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 73, 677 P.2d at 117–18 (internal citations omitted).
8. See Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621, 635, 733 P.2d 182, 190–
91 (1987).
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Exhaustion Is Not Required If the Agency Lacks Jurisdiction9

No exhaustion requirement arises unless an agency has jurisdiction
over a claim.10 For example, in State v. Tacoma-Pierce County Multiple
Listing Service,11 the trial court dismissed antitrust actions filed by the
Attorney General under the Washington Consumer Protection Act
(CPA)12 for, among other things, failure to pursue an administrative
remedy with either the Department of Licensing or the Real Estate
Commission.13 The Supreme Court of Washington reversed and found the
exhaustion doctrine did not apply because neither the Department nor the
Commission was authorized to review CPA violations.14 Thus, the
plaintiff could not be faulted for failing to exhaust, because exhaustion
did not apply.15
B.

Exhaustion Is Not Required If the Agency Lacks Clear Review
Procedures16

Only clearly defined exhaustion requirements are binding.17 A good
example of this is found in Smoke v. City of Seattle.18 There, the plaintiff
property owners challenged the denial of a building use permit.19 The
applicable municipal code stated that the denial of the particular permit
type—a “Type 1” master use permit (MUP)—was nonappealable.20 Still,
the City argued the plaintiffs should have obtained a building site code
interpretation, which would have been appealable.21 Although the
plaintiffs could have obtained the interpretation, the Supreme Court of

9. This discussion overlaps with the adequate remedy discussion in section I.C.
10. S. Hollywood, 101 Wash. 2d at 73, 677 P.2d at 117–18.
11. 95 Wash. 2d 280, 622 P.2d 1190 (1980).
12. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86 (2016).
13. Tacoma-Pierce, 95 Wash. 2d at 282–83, 622 P.2d at 1191–92.
14. Id. at 284, 622 P.2d at 1192.
15. Id.; see also Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d 861, 868, 947
P.2d 1208, 1212 (1997) (excusing plaintiff’s failure to exhaust remedies with Growth Management
Hearings Board because the Board lacked jurisdiction to review the city council determination at
issue).
16. This discussion overlaps with the final, appealable order discussion in section I.D.2.
17. Smoke v. City of Seattle, 132 Wash. 2d 214, 224, 937 P.2d 186, 190 (1997).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 219, 937 P.2d at 189.
20. Id. at 217–18, 223, 937 P.2d at 187, 190.
21. Id. at 223, 937 P.2d at 190.
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Washington rejected the City’s argument they were required to do so.22
The Court reasoned that such a requirement was not clearly defined:
[T]he ordinance itself expressly states that Type I MUP decisions
are nonappealable. See [Seattle Municipal Code] 23.76.004(B).
No provision of the code suggests or requires that an applicant
obtain an interpretation as an administrative remedy for a decision
denying a Type I MUP application. The ordinance itself indicates
that once the permitting decision has been made there are no other
administrative remedies available.23
In sum, the City could not hold the plaintiffs to an optional appeal
procedure that was not described as mandatory in the code.24
C.

Exhaustion Is Not Required If the Agency Cannot Provide an
Adequate Remedy

Plaintiffs must seek administrative review only if the agency can
provide an adequate remedy.25 This may be the most significant inquiry
for courts.26 The bar for an adequate remedy is quite low; incomplete relief
may be an adequate remedy.27 The test for an adequate remedy is whether
the agency is “empowered to entertain the type of claim and enforce its
decision.”28
Despite the low bar, the perceived inadequacy of a remedy is
insufficient to escape the exhaustion requirement. Plaintiffs must pursue
remedies thought to be unavailing because the lack of an adequate remedy
cannot be speculative.29 For example, in Northwest Ecosystem Alliance v.

22. Id. at 227, 937 P.2d at 192.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Cost Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 178 Wash. 2d 635, 642, 310 P.3d 804, 808
(2013).
26. See id. (“The primary question in exhaustion cases, however, is whether the relief sought can
be obtained through an available administrative remedy.”).
27. See, e.g., Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 119 Wash. 2d 761, 777, 837 P.2d
1007, 1016 (1992) (concluding that adequate remedy existed where the agency could grant only
declaratory relief even though the appellants sought both declaratory and injunctive relief).
28. Credit Gen. Ins. Co. v. Zewdu, 82 Wash. App. 620, 626, 919 P.2d 93, 97 (1996). Consequently,
there is substantial overlap between an agency’s lack of jurisdiction and its inability to provide relief.
See id.; Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d 861, 868, 947 P.2d 1208,
1212.
29. See, e.g., Dils v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 51 Wash. App. 216, 219, 752 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1988)
(rejecting plaintiff’s claim of inadequacy where plaintiff could have objected to agency’s claim
processing procedures but did not).
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Washington Forest Practices Board,30 a group of environmentalists sued
several state agencies for their failure to promulgate regulations that
protected forests.31 The agencies alleged that the environmentalists failed
to exhaust their administrative remedy of petitioning for rule making.32
The environmentalists argued that this was unnecessary due to the
agencies’ historic reluctance to address conservation issues.33 The
Supreme Court of Washington agreed with the agencies, reasoning that it
would not assume the agencies would ignore environmental issues.34
Thus, an adequate remedy existed, and exhaustion was required.35
D.

There Is No Obligation to Exhaust Without a Final, Appealable
Order

Finally, “[n]o exhaustion requirement arises without the issuance of a
final, appealable order.”36 The term “final, appealable order” is redundant:
an order is not appealable unless it is final, and vice versa.37 A final,
appealable order will be found where the order (1) clearly asserts a legal
relationship and (2) makes clear it is the final determination of rights.38
Doubts as to finality are resolved against the agency and in favor of the
plaintiff.39
1.

Final, Appealable Orders Can Be Informal

Final orders can be informal letters.40 In Bock v. State,41 the plaintiff
sought a writ of mandamus to compel the State Board of Pilotage
Commissioners to issue him a pilot’s license.42 The plaintiff failed his
license exam and appealed the result, which was affirmed by a review
30. 149 Wash. 2d 67, 66 P.3d 614 (2003).
31. Id. at 69, 66 P.3d at 614.
32. Id. at 71–72, 66 P.3d at 616.
33. Id. at 78, 66 P.3d at 619.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621, 634, 733 P.2d 182, 190
(1987).
37. See Smoke v. City of Seattle, 132 Wash. 2d 214, 222–24, 937 P.2d 186, 189–90 (1997).
38. Valley View, 107 Wash. 2d at 634, 733 P.2d at 190.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Bock v. State, 91 Wash. 2d 94, 99–100, 586 P.2d 1173, 1176 (1978) (finding that
agency’s letter to plaintiff constituted final order because the letter denied a right and fixed a legal
relationship).
41. 91 Wash. 2d 94, 586 P.2d 1173 (1978).
42. Id. at 95, 586 P.2d at 1174.
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panel.43 The Board then informed the plaintiff by letter that it would take
no further action on his case.44 In response, the plaintiff sued, rather than
participating in the Board’s administrative appeal procedures.45
The trial court dismissed the case because the plaintiff failed to exhaust
available remedies, and the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed.46 The
Court acknowledged that the letter was informal, but ultimately deemed
it a final action because it denied a right and clearly communicated the
end of administrative review.47 The Court stated that a more formal denial
would be “preferable” but reasoned that the informality did not harm the
plaintiff where he had actual notice of the Board denying his application.48
2.

Final, Appealable Orders Require Clear Appeal Procedures and
Consistent Agency Action

The lack of clear administrative decision-making procedures prevents
a finding of a final order.49 In Valley View Industrial Park v. City of
Redmond,50 the plaintiff submitted several building permit applications to
the City of Redmond.51 After repeatedly requesting additional information
from the plaintiff, the City downzoned the plaintiff’s land and rejected by
letter the plaintiff’s request to modify the rezone.52 The following year,
the City informed the plaintiff it deemed the building permit applications
abandoned and lapsed, but city officials later assured the plaintiff it could
proceed under the permits.53 The city council then denied another of the
plaintiff’s applications to rezone the property.54 After the City refused to

43. Id. at 95–96, 586 P.2d at 1174.
44. Id. at 96, 586 P.2d at 1175.
45. Id. at 97–98, 586 P.2d at 1175.
46. Id. at 97, 100, 586 P.2d at 1175, 1177.
47. Id. at 99, 586 P.2d at 1176.
48. Id.; see also Smoke v. City of Seattle, 132 Wash. 2d 214, 222–23, 937 P.2d 186, 190 (1997)
(finding an informal letter from a city attorney was a final, appealable order, even though the letter
stated it was not an appealable legal determination, because the agency explicitly denied an
application); Harrington v. Spokane Cty., 128 Wash. App. 202, 214, 114 P.3d 1233, 1240 (2005)
(finding the grant of a permit constituted a final order because it fixed a legal relationship, and related
interim communications were not final determinations of rights).
49. See Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621, 634, 733 P.2d 182, 190
(1987).
50. 107 Wash. 2d 621, 733 P.2d 182 (1987).
51. Id. at 628, 733 P.2d at 187.
52. Id. at 628–29, 733 P.2d at 187.
53. Id. at 629, 733 P.2d at 187–88.
54. Id.
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allow the plaintiff to proceed with a modified proposal, the plaintiff
appealed that denial to superior court.55
On review, the Court found the letter informing the plaintiff of the
lapsed building permits was not a final order because it did not fix a clear
end to the administrative process.56 This was so for two reasons. First, the
City lacked a clear administrative decision-making process regarding
building permit lapses.57 Second, the officials assured the plaintiff its
rights had vested after the City sent the letter to the contrary.58 The
“unclear and inconsistent nature of the permit lapse process” prevented a
finding that the letter was a final order, so no exhaustion requirement
arose.59
3.

Final, Appealable Orders Must Be Issued in Compliance with
Code Requirements

In addition, an agency’s failure to comply with relevant code provisions
may render its decision insufficient to constitute a final order.60 This was
the case in WCHS, Inc. v. City of Lynnwood.61 There, plaintiff WCHS was
an operator of opiate substitution treatment centers.62 The city planning
manager informed WCHS that Lynwood zoning laws permitted
construction of a new treatment center at a particular site.63 Consequently,
WCHS entered into a lease for that site and filed applications for a
building permit and business license.64 That same day, the city council
held an emergency meeting regarding opiate substitution treatment
centers and, four days later, changed the zoning laws so the proposed site
would be illegal.65 The City denied both WCHS’s building permit and
business license in separate letters that did not inform WCHS of its right

55. Id.
56. Id. at 634–35, 733 P.2d at 190–91.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 635, 733 P.2d at 190–91.
60. See, e.g., WCHS, Inc. v. City of Lynnwood, 120 Wash. App. 668, 679–80, 86 P.3d 1169, 1174–
75 (2004).
61. 120 Wash. App. 668, 86 P.3d 1169 (2004).
62. Id. at 671, 86 P.3d at 1170.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 672, 86 P.3d at 1171.
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to a review hearing.66 WCHS then sued for declaratory judgment and a
writ of mandamus.67
In finding for WCHS, the Washington Court of Appeals rejected the
City’s argument that the denial letters were final orders that should have
been appealed administratively.68 The court reasoned that neither letter
complied with the city code provisions governing who should receive
notice of decisions and requiring disclosure of the right to appeal.69 Given
this non-compliance, the letters could not give rise to exhaustion.70
4.

Final, Appealable Orders May Need Facial Evidence of Both
Finality and a Direct Response to the Filed Request

A denial letter may not be a final, appealable order unless it has
language demonstrating its finality and its direct response to the filed
request.71 For example, the WCHS court noted that the denial letters did
not use words like “decision,” “final,” or “appealable.”72 Instead, one
letter stated that the plaintiff’s application was “‘incomplete’ but would
remain open for 180 days.”73 This inconsistent and unclear language left
doubt as to the decisions’ finality and thus the letters were not clearly
understandable as final determinations of rights.74
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Washington recently held that final
orders must directly respond to the filed request.75 In Cost Management
Services, Inc. v. City of Lakewood (CMS),76 a corporation believed it
mistakenly paid a city tax during 2004 and September 2008, so it stopped
paying the tax and filed a refund claim.77 The City responded by issuing
an order to pay past-due taxes from October 2008 forward.78 Although the
City’s administrative procedures could have provided relief, the plaintiff
could not access those procedures because the City failed to respond
66. Id. at 673, 86 P.3d at 1171.
67. Id. at 673–74, 86 P.3d at 1171.
68. Id. at 679–80, 86 P.3d at 1174–75.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 680, 86 P.3d at 1175.
71. See id. at 679–80, 86 P.3d at 1175.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 679, 86 P.3d at 1174.
74. Id. at 680, 86 P.3d at 1175.
75. See Cost Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 178 Wash. 2d 635, 645, 310 P.3d 804, 810
(2013).
76. 178 Wash. 2d 63, 310 P.3d 804 (2013).
77. Id. at 638, 310 P.3d at 806.
78. Id.
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directly to its application.79 The CMS Court held that the failure to respond
thus obviated the administrative exhaustion requirement.80
II.

EXCEPTIONS TO EXHAUSTION APPLY WHEN FAIRNESS
AND PRACTICALITY OUTWEIGH THE SUBSTANTIAL
POLICY INTERESTS SUPPORTING EXHAUSTION

Even where all conditions precedent exist and the exhaustion
requirement attaches, courts will excuse the failure to exhaust if fairness
and practicality concerns outweigh the policies supporting exhaustion.81
These policy interests loom large when courts evaluate whether to excuse
exhaustion.82 Accordingly, exceptions to exhaustion are rare. The only
circumstances where courts have excused the failure to exhaust have been
when exhaustion was futile,83 the plaintiff’s claim involved only legal
issues,84 and when due process demanded it.85
A.

Futility Excuses the Failure to Exhaust When the Requested Relief
Cannot Be Granted as a Matter of Law

Exhaustion of remedies will be excused as futile when “the available
remedies are inadequate, or if they are vain and useless.”86 Futility is
decided as a matter of law.87 The burden borne by the party asserting
futility has not been precisely defined. In Estate of Friedman v. Pierce
County,88 the Supreme Court of Washington explained that the burden is
lower than uncontroverted evidence, which the Court called “exceedingly
high” and “virtually impossible” to meet.89 However, the Friedman Court
did not explore the issue further.90

79. Id. at 643, 310 P.3d at 809.
80. Id. at 645, 310 P.3d at 810.
81. See S. Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass’n for Pres. of Neighborhood Safety & Env’t v. King Cty.,
101 Wash. 2d 68, 73–74, 677 P.2d 114, 118 (1984).
82. Id. at 74, 677 P.2d at 118.
83. See Orion Corp. v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 441, 693 P.2d 1369 (1985).
84. See Credit Gen. Ins. Co. v. Zewdu, 82 Wash. App. 620, 919 P.2d 93 (1996).
85. See Wash. Teamsters Welfare Trust Fund v. DePiano, 26 Wash. App. 52, 612 P.2d 805 (1980).
86. Orion Corp. v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 441, 458, 693 P.2d 1369, 1379 (1985) (quoting 4 ROBERT
M. ANDERSON, ZONING § 26.10 (2d ed. 1977)). This overlaps with the adequate remedy discussion
in section I.C.
87. Beard v. King Cty., 76 Wash. App. 863, 871, 889 P.2d 501, 506 (1995).
88. 112 Wash. 2d 68, 768 P.2d 462 (1989).
89. Id. at 77, 768 P.2d at 466.
90. See id.
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Futility excuses exhaustion only in “rare factual situations.”91 Thus far,
Washington courts have approved the futility defense in only two
situations: when the requested relief is prohibited by legislation or a
statewide policy,92 and when evidence supports an inference of bias on the
part of appeal decision-makers.93
The most well-known Washington futility case is Orion Corporation
v. State.94 There, a developer brought an inverse condemnation action
against the State, alleging that state and county shoreline management
policies rendered its property effectively useless.95 The record
demonstrated that the State made a “conscious policy choice” to preserve
the area owned by the developer and that the State planned to create an
estuarine sanctuary that required the developer’s property.96 Because
these decisions forced the developer to keep the land in its natural state,
the Supreme Court of Washington found that applying for a conditional
use permit would be futile.97 The Court acknowledged that the futility
exception was rare, but reasoned that it applied on these facts because the
“willingness to consider an application is irrelevant if there is no hope of
success if one is submitted.”98 The Court has since characterized the
holding in Orion as applying to cases where “legislation or statewide
policy” prevents relief.99
In reaching its conclusion, the Orion Court stated that “futility
addresses more than a direct showing of bias or prejudice on the part of
discretionary decision makers.”100 This is consistent with the general rule
that a plaintiff’s subjective belief is insufficient to establish futility.101 For
91. Dils v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 51 Wash. App. 216, 219, 752 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1988); see also
Spokoiny v. Wash. St. Youth Soccer Ass’n, 128 Wash. App. 794, 802, 117 P.3d 1141, 1145–46 (2005)
(finding no futility where plaintiff was concerned the administrative process would not provide timely
relief); KSLW by Wells v. City of Renton, 47 Wash. App. 587, 591–92, 736 P.2d 664, 667–68 (1986)
(finding no futility where plaintiff abandoned its administrative appeal purportedly after the City
agreed a court should resolve the dispute).
92. Orion Corp. v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 441, 457–60, 693 P.2d 1369, 1379–80 (1985).
93. Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Wash., Inc., 112 Wash. 2d 127, 133, 769 P.2d 298, 301
(1989).
94. 103 Wash. 2d 441, 693 P.2d 1369 (1985).
95. Id. at 443, 456, 693 P.2d at 1371, 1378.
96. Id. at 457, 693 P.2d at 1378.
97. Id. at 460, 693 P.2d at 1380.
98. Id. at 457–58, 693 P.2d at 1379.
99. Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 119 Wash. 2d 761, 778, 837 P.2d 1007, 1016
(1992).
100. 103 Wash. 2d at 458, 693 P.2d at 1379.
101. See Buechler v. Wenatchee Valley Coll., 174 Wash. App. 141, 154, 298 P.3d 110, 117 (2013);
Beard v. King Cty., 76 Wash. App. 863, 871, 889 P.2d 501, 505 (1995).
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example, in Beard v. King County,102 a police officer under investigation
for rape did not apply for a promotion after he was told he would not be
considered for the job by the sheriff who personally made promotion
decisions.103 After being cleared of the rape charge, the officer sued for
unfair employment practices and alleged the sheriff’s statement rendered
any administrative appeal futile.104 The Washington Court of Appeals
found futility did not apply because the sheriff could have been forced to
change his off-the-record position in light of the formal selection process
if the plaintiff was the most qualified candidate.105 Beard suggests futility
will not be found when there is the slightest chance the administrative
process could provide relief.
However, in Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Washington, Inc.,106
the Supreme Court of Washington found futility may apply when the facts
support an inference of the decision-makers’ bias.107 There, the plaintiff
was fired from the defendant hospital after an investigation into whether
he sexually assaulted a patient.108 The plaintiff sued the hospital for
wrongful termination without first pursuing the contractually required
four-step grievance procedure.109 The plaintiff argued that the procedure
would be futile because it required him to appeal to the hospital
administrator, whose assistant was instrumental in the underlying
investigation.110 Finding in the plaintiff’s favor, the Court reasoned that
the evidence showed people from each step of the appeal procedure made
the initial decision to fire him.111 The Court thus found that the plaintiff
raised a genuine issue of bias.112
Although this decision may appear contrary to the statement in Orion
and the rule against speculative futility, it is important to note the precise
issue before the Baldwin Court. The question was whether to affirm the
denial of the hospital’s motion for a directed verdict, meaning the Court
viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and could
reverse the denial “only if no evidence or reasonable inference exist[ed]
102. 76 Wash. App. 863, 889 P.2d 501 (1995).
103. Id. at 864–65, 869, 889 P.2d at 502–03.
104. Id. at 869–70, 889 P.2d at 504–05.
105. Id. at 871, 889 P.2d at 505–06.
106. 112 Wash. 2d 127, 769 P.2d 298 (1989).
107. Id. at 133, 769 P.2d at 301.
108. Id. at 129–30, 769 P.2d at 299–300.
109. Id. at 130, 769 P.2d at 300.
110. Id. at 132–33, 769 P.2d at 300–01.
111. Id. at 133, 769 P.2d at 301.
112. Id.
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which would be sufficient to sustain a verdict for” the hospital.113 In other
words, the Court did not find that futility was conclusively established;
rather, it found that there was sufficient evidence of futility to survive a
motion for directed verdict.114 Importantly, the Baldwin Court also stated
that the “principle that a subjective belief of futility is sufficient to invoke
the exception would conflict with the strong bias toward requiring
exhaustion in Washington.”115
Ultimately, futility remains an extraordinary remedy that courts are
reluctant to grant.116
B.

Failure to Exhaust May Be Excused When the Issue Is Legal, Not
Factual

“If a lawsuit presents only issues of law, the court may excuse
exhaustion because the agency’s usual fact finding task is not implicated,
and, in any event, the courts have ultimate authority to interpret
statutes.”117 This exception often arises in the context of constitutional
challenges.118 As-applied constitutional challenges require factual
determinations, meaning that administrative exhaustion is appropriate.119
By contrast, facial constitutional challenges are purely legal questions and
typically fall outside an agency’s expertise and authority, meaning
exhaustion is generally not required.120 For example, a facial
constitutional challenge may appear as a challenge to an agency’s
jurisdiction.121 However, if the “agency is charged with interpreting and

113. Id. at 132, 769 P.2d at 300–01.
114. See id. at 133, 769 P.2d at 301.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Buechler v. Wenatchee Valley Coll., 174 Wash. App. 141, 154, 298 P.3d 110, 117
(2013); Spokoiny v. Wash. St. Youth Soccer Ass’n, 128 Wash. App. 794, 802, 117 P.3d 1141, 1145–
46 (2005); Dils v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 51 Wash. App. 216, 219, 752 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1988);
KSLW by Wells v. City of Renton, 47 Wash. App. 587, 592–93, 736 P.2d 664, 667–68 (1986). But
see Prisk v. City of Poulsbo, 46 Wash. App. 793, 798, 732 P.2d 1013, 1017 (1987) (concluding that
fairness and practicality outweighed policies supporting exhaustion, in part because “the only avenue
of appeal would have been to the city council, a body which had itself previously imposed these fees
directly upon” the plaintiff).
117. Credit Gen. Ins. Co. v. Zewdu, 82 Wash. App. 620, 628–29, 919 P.2d 93, 98 (1996).
118. See, e.g., Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 337, 787 P.2d 907, 916 (1990)
(discussing plaintiff’s as-applied challenge to the ordinance and its relationship to the exhaustion
requirement).
119. See id.
120. See id.; Zewdu, 82 Wash. App. at 628–29, 919 P.2d at 98–99; Schreiber v. Riemcke, 11 Wash.
App. 873, 875, 526 P.2d 904, 906 (1974).
121. See, e.g., Spokane Cty. v. State, 136 Wash. 2d 644, 652, 966 P.2d 305, 309 (1998).
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applying a particular statute, that agency expertise usually assists the court
in performing the judicial function.”122 Thus, even facial constitutional
challenges may require exhaustion.
C.

Procedural Due Process Violations Excuse the Failure to Exhaust

Finally, it can be argued that the exhaustion requirement violates due
process, although this argument should be a last resort.123 Due process
arguments may excuse exhaustion if a plaintiff was wrongfully denied
meaningful access to appeal procedures.124 In Washington Teamsters
Welfare Trust Fund v. DePiano,125 insurance trusts sued a patient for
medical claims that the trusts alleged they mistakenly paid.126 The patient
countersued for wrongful denial of claims.127 The trusts alleged the
patient’s claims should be dismissed for failure to exhaust contractual
remedies before filing his court action.128 The Washington Court of
Appeals rejected this argument, reasoning that “[e]xhaustion is excused
not only when resort to such procedures would be futile, but also when a
claimant has been wrongfully denied meaningful access to those
procedures and where the available remedy is inadequate.”129 The court
found the patient lacked meaningful access to the procedures because he
was “denied benefits by both trusts and had been called into court by both
trusts shortly after those denials.”130 Thus, the court did not punish the
patient for pursuing a counterclaim rather than administrative remedies.131
Due process will also excuse exhaustion when the plaintiff received no
notice of the agency’s determination. For example, in Gardner v. Pierce
County Board of Commissioners,132 a landowner appealed a commission’s

122. Zewdu, 82 Wash. App. at 629, 919 P.2d at 98; accord Retail Store Emp. Union, Local 1001
Chartered By Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. Wash. Surveying & Rating Bureau, Wash.
Bureau, 87 Wash. 2d 887, 907 n.7, 558 P.2d 215, 227 n.7 (1976).
123. Cf. Rosen v. City of Tacoma, 24 Wash. App. 735, 741, 603 P.2d 846, 850 (1979) (holding that
arbitrary and capricious municipal agency actions are not a basis for relief without exhaustion).
124. See, e.g., Wash. Teamsters Welfare Trust Fund v. DePiano, 26 Wash. App. 52, 57, 612 P.2d
805, 808 (1980).
125. 26 Wash. App. 52, 612 P.2d 805 (1980).
126. Id. at 53, 623 P.2d at 806.
127. Id. at 54, 623 P.2d at 806.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 57, 623 P.2d at 808.
130. Id. at 58, 623 P.2d at 808.
131. See id.
132. 27 Wash. App. 241, 617 P.2d 743 (1980).
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approval of a preliminary plat adjacent to his home.133 The County
conceded that it did not provide notice of its determination and that the
plaintiff was unaware of the determination until he attended a subsequent
hearing.134 The Washington Court of Appeals held that the landowner did
not fail to exhaust, because “[w]here one has not enjoyed a fair
opportunity to exhaust the administrative process . . . exhaustion of
administrative remedies will not be required.”135
III. WASHINGTON LAW CURRENTLY INVOLVES ELEMENTS
THAT OVERLAP AMONG THE PRECONDITIONS AND
EXCEPTIONS TO EXHAUSTION
In sum, courts require exhaustion when four conditions precedent are
met: (1) the agency has jurisdiction over the claim; (2) the agency has
clear review procedures; (3) the agency can provide an adequate remedy;
and (4) the agency issues a final, appealable order. If these conditions
precedent are satisfied, the exhaustion requirement attaches to a claim.
Once the exhaustion requirement attaches, courts may excuse a failure to
exhaust if matters of fairness and practicality outweigh the policy interests
supporting exhaustion.
Many of these concepts overlap, which contributes to the murky
discussion of administrative exhaustion currently found in Washington
case law. For example, although we frame the adequate remedy
requirement as a condition precedent, the agency’s ability to provide an
adequate remedy also permeates the exception analysis. Whether an
agency can provide an adequate remedy is also relevant to jurisdiction,
futility, and the ability to issue a final, appealable order. The uniting
principle is the agency’s ability to provide relief, a crucial piece of the
exhaustion analysis.

133. Id. at 242, 617 P.2d at 744.
134. Id. at 243, 617 P.2d at 745.
135. Id. at 243–44, 617 P.2d at 745. We note that Gardner precedes the enactment of the Land Use
Petition Act (LUPA), WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70C (1996). “LUPA does not require that a party
receive individualized notice of a land use decision in order to be subject to the time limits for filing
a LUPA petition.” Samuel’s Furniture, Inc. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 147 Wash. 2d 440, 462, 54 P.3d
1194, 1205 (2002).
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IV. EQUITABLE TOLLING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
WHILE A PLAINTIFF PURSUES ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES WOULD PROTECT VALID CLAIMS AND
PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESSES
Given the exhaustion doctrine’s lack of clarity, it can be difficult for
plaintiffs—and their attorneys—to know whether the exhaustion
requirement applies. Moreover, if a plaintiff chooses to pursue
administrative remedies, the process can be time-consuming.136 While the
plaintiff maneuvers the administrative process, the clock is running on his
or her claim.137 This can result in an otherwise valid claim being barred
from judicial review, a harsh result that does not truly serve the rationales
underlying the exhaustion doctrine.
Accordingly, this article proposes that Washington courts expand the
current equitable tolling doctrine and implement an approach that
California and other states have used to protect such claims: tolling the
statute of limitations while a plaintiff pursues administrative remedies.
Under Washington law, a court “may toll the statute of limitations
when justice requires such tolling but it must use the doctrine
sparingly.”138 As set forth in Douchette v. Bethel School District No.
403,139 equitable tolling is available only where there is (1) an exercise of
diligence by the plaintiff and (2) bad faith, deception, or false assurances
by the defendant.140 Thus, in the absence of a showing of bad faith on the
part of the defendant, a plaintiff who diligently pursues administrative
remedies cannot have the statute of limitations tolled on his or her claim.
This effectively punishes a plaintiff who takes timely action but must
undergo the administrative process before seeking judicial relief.

136. See, e.g., Cost Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 178 Wash. 2d 635, 640, 310 P.3d 804,
807 (2013) (plaintiff waited six months for agency action that was ultimately unresponsive); Smoke
v. City of Seattle, 132 Wash. 2d 214, 218, 937 P.2d 186, 187 (1997) (plaintiff engaged in more than
a year of dispute with City about permit status); Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 107
Wash. 2d 621, 629, 733 P.2d 182, 187–88 (1987) (plaintiff negotiated with City for three months after
zoning request denial).
137. Equitable tolling would not be necessary if completing the administrative process preserved
the claim as it existed at the time of filing the administrative appeal. However, we have not found a
case that has so held. Alternatively, the legislature could address this issue by passing a statute that
provides: “Statutes of limitations will be tolled during an administrative appeal that is exhausted.”
138. Nickum v. City of Bainbridge Island, 153 Wash. App. 366, 378, 223 P.3d 1172, 1177–78
(2009).
139. 117 Wash. 2d 805, 818 P.2d 1362 (1991).
140. Id. at 812, 818 P.2d at 1365.
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California courts address this issue by applying equitable tolling
“[w]hen an injured person has several legal remedies, and reasonably and
in good faith, pursues one.”141 Under California law, where the exhaustion
requirement applies, “equitable tolling is automatic.”142 As the California
Supreme Court explains, tolling has many benefits:
Tolling eases the pressure on parties “concurrently to seek redress
in two separate forums with the attendant danger of conflicting
decisions on the same issue.” By alleviating the fear of claim
forfeiture, it affords grievants the opportunity to pursue informal
remedies, a process we have repeatedly encouraged. The tolling
doctrine does so without compromising defendants’ significant
“interest in being promptly apprised of claims against them in
order that they may gather and preserve evidence” because that
notice interest is satisfied by the filing of the first proceeding that
gives rise to tolling. Lastly, tolling benefits the court system by
reducing the costs associated with a duplicative filing
requirement, in many instances rendering later court proceedings
either easier and cheaper to resolve or wholly unnecessary.143
Other courts around the country have also recognized that equitable
tolling constitutes prudent public policy in similar contexts.144
A.

Equitable Tolling Is Consistent with the Policies Supporting
Exhaustion

Along with these advantages, we note that equitable tolling would be
consistent with the policies underlying exhaustion that have been
articulated by Washington courts. These policies include preserving the
administrative process and agency autonomy; allowing the agency to
develop the factual record and exercise its expertise;

141. McDonald v. Antelope Valley Cmty. Coll. Dist., 194 P.3d 1026, 1031 (Cal. 2008) (quoting
Elkins v. Derby, 525 P.2d 81, 84 (1974)).
142. McDonald, 194 P.2d at 1032.
143. Id. at 1032 (internal citations omitted).
144. See, e.g., Am. Marine Corp. v. Sholin, 295 P.3d 924, 927 (Alaska 2013) (quoting Gudenau &
Co. v. Sweeney Ins., Inc., 736 P.2d 763, 768 (Alaska 1987)) (“The equitable tolling doctrine is
applicable ‘when a plaintiff has multiple legal remedies available’ so that ‘[c]ourts will not force a
plaintiff to simultaneously pursue two separate and duplicative remedies.’”); Weidow v. Uninsured
Emp’rs’ Fund, 2010 MT 292, ¶ 28, 359 Mont. 77, 246 P.3d 704 (noting that equitable tolling should
be applied sparingly, but “reject[ing] any one-size-fits-all approach that would serve only to
undermine the purpose of the equitable tolling doctrine and could deprive a plaintiff of his or her
rights when such an approach would serve no policy purpose”); Enron Oil & Gas Co. v. Freudenthal,
861 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Wyo. 1993) (“The doctrine acts to toll the statute of limitations for the one
remedy while the party is pursuing the other.”).
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promoting efficiency; and discouraging individuals from ignoring agency
procedure by resorting to the courts.145 Tolling the statute of limitations
addresses these concerns by encouraging claimants to pursue
administrative remedies without fear of losing access to judicial review.
Moreover, the application of equitable tolling would create fair
outcomes for plaintiffs who diligently pursue their claims: “[i]n deciding
whether to grant an equitable remedy, courts often ‘balance the equities’
between the parties, taking into consideration the relief sought by the
plaintiff and the hardship imposed on the defendant.”146 Tolling the statute
of limitations strikes an appropriate balance between awarding a plaintiff
complete relief and the relatively minor hardship a defendant suffers from
an extended limitations period.147 CMS provides a clear example of this.
There, the plaintiff became aware of its claim in November 2008 but did
not file suit until June 2009 because it was waiting for the City to respond
to its appeal for administrative relief.148 Ultimately, the City’s action was
nonresponsive.149 The Supreme Court of Washinton held that the failure
to respond obviated the administrative exhaustion requirement.150
However, the three-year statute of limitations prevented the plaintiff from
recovering any taxes paid before June 2006.151 Had the statute of
limitations been tolled, the plaintiff’s claim would include seven months
more of back taxes. Equitable tolling in this and similar circumstances
would eliminate “the potential for abuse which legal process may serve in
the hands of public officials, bankrolled with public funds, who seek to
achieve by delay and the necessity for costly court suits or administrative
hearings what they cannot achieve on the merits[.]”152
With these considerations in mind, we propose that Washington courts
apply equitable tolling where the plaintiff exercises diligence in pursuing

145. See S. Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass’n for Pres. of Neighborhood Safety & Env’t v. King Cty.,
101 Wash. 2d 68, 73–74, 677 P.2d 114, 117 (1984).
146. Douchette v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 117 Wash. 2d 805, 812, 818 P.2d 1362, 1365 (1991)
(citing 27 AM. JUR. 2d § 107 (1966)).
147. We further address this hardship below in our discussion of the rationales behind statutes of
limitation. See infra section IV.B.
148. Cost Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 178 Wash. 2d 635, 639–40, 310 P.3d 804, 807–
08 (2013).
149. Id. at 639, 310 P.3d at 807.
150. Id. at 645, 310 P.3d at 810.
151. See id.
152. City of Seattle v. Blume, 134 Wash. 2d 243, 259, 947 P.2d 223, 230 (1997) (quoting King v.
City of Seattle, 84 Wash. 2d 239, 252–53, 525 P.2d 228, 236 (1974)).
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administrative remedies, without requiring a showing of bad faith or
deception on the administrative body’s behalf.153
B.

Equitable Tolling Is Consistent with the Policies Supporting
Statutes of Limitation

We acknowledge that, unlike California, Washington requires bad faith
as a predicate for equitable tolling.154 It should be noted that bad faith as
a requirement—rather than simply a relevant factor—is fairly new and
unexplored. The Douchette Court established it as such in 1991.155 But,
the case Douchette relies upon, Copeland v. Desert Inn Hotel,156
recognized bad faith as only one possible ground—not a prerequisite—
for granting equitable relief.157 Historically, Washington courts evaluating
equitable remedies align with the Copeland Court’s treatment of bad
faith.158 Without further explanation or citation, the Douchette Court
elevated its importance, stating, “[i]n the absence of bad faith on the part
of the defendant and reasonable diligence on the part of the plaintiff,
equity cannot be invoked.”159 The basis for requiring this element is thus
unclear.
Nonetheless, we recognize that the bad faith element has been
embraced by Washington courts.160 Still, given the positive effects of our

153. While we argue that bad faith should not be required, we note that the failure to equitably toll
the statute of limitations has the potential to incentivize bad faith on the part of the administrative
body. For example, if the statute of limitations is running while the agency processes a claim, the
agency may be incentivized to delay so as to limit liability.
154. Douchette v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 117 Wash. 2d 805, 812, 818 P.2d 1362, 1365 (1991).
155. See id. at 811–12, 818 P.2d at 1364–65.
156. 673 P.2d 490 (Nev. 1983).
157. Id. at 826.
158. See, e.g., Dodge v. Scripps, 179 Wash. 308, 317, 37 P.2d 896, 900 (1934) (characterizing bad
faith as a “foundation for equitable relief,” but not establishing it as a requirement); Niemi v. Brewster,
154 Wash. 181, 186–87, 281 P. 488, 489–90 (1929) (discussing bad faith as one possible ground for
rejecting plaintiff’s claim, along with undue prejudice to defendant); Morris v. Hillman Inv. Co., 99
Wash. 276, 283, 169 P. 837 (1918) (discussing various bases for applying equitable estoppel, one of
which was bad faith); Young v. Jones, 72 Wash. 277, 282–83, 130 P. 90, 92–93 (1913) (same). It is
also well-established that a party’s own bad faith precludes a grant of equitable relief in his or her
favor. Retail Clerks Health & Welfare Trust Funds v. Shopland Supermarket, Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 939,
949, 640 P.2d 1051, 1057 (1982) (“He who seeks equity must do equity . . . he who comes into equity
must come with clean hands.”). But it does not follow from this principle that the opposing party’s
bad faith should be required.
159. Douchette, 117 Wash. 2d at 812, 818 P.2d at 1365.
160. See, e.g., Millay v. Cam, 135 Wash. 2d 193, 206, 955 P.2d 791, 796 (1998) (citing Douchette
as basis for requiring bad faith); Danzer v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 104 Wash. App. 307, 318, 16
P.3d 35, 40 (2000) (same); Prekeges v. King Cty., 98 Wash. App. 275, 283, 990 P.2d 406, 410 (1999)
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equitable tolling proposal, we urge the courts to carve out an exception to
Douchette in the administrative exhaustion context. As argued above, we
believe this would serve the interests underlying exhaustion and lead to
better outcomes for Washington claimants. Moreover, it would be
otherwise consistent with Washington law.
For example, we acknowledge the principle that the “statute of
limitations is ‘a legislative declaration of public policy which the courts
can do no less than respect.’”161 Generally, Washington courts will not
read into statutes of limitation an exception that has not been embodied
therein.162 Thus, “[i]n Washington equitable tolling is appropriate when
consistent with both the purpose of the statute providing the cause of
action and the purpose of the statute of limitations.”163 Otherwise,
equitable tolling would “essentially allow[] a judicial branch officer to
override a legislative determination.”164
In this circumstance, however, the application of equitable tolling
would not invade the province of the legislature. “The policy behind
statutes of limitation is ‘protection of the defendant, and the courts, from
litigation of stale claims where plaintiffs have slept on their rights and
evidence may have been lost or witnesses’ memories faded.’”165 But
where a plaintiff diligently pursues administrative remedies, these
concerns are not implicated. The Montana Supreme Court articulated this
principle well, noting that “limitations periods are designed to ensure
justice by preventing surprise, but no surprise exists when defendants are
already on notice of the substantive claims being brought against them.”166
By engaging in the system of administrative appeals, a plaintiff gives
timely notice to a defendant and moves the claim forward, fulfilling the
purposes of the statute of limitations.

(same); Finkelstein v. Sec. Props., Inc., 76 Wash. App. 733, 739–40, 888 P.2d 161, 166–67 (1995)
(same).
161. Cost Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 178 Wash. 2d 635, 651, 310 P.3d 804, 813
(2013) (quoting J.M. Arthur & Co. v. Burke, 83 Wash. 690, 693, 145 P. 974, 975 (1915)).
162. Id. at 651, 310 P.3d at 813.
163. Millay, 135 Wash. 2d at 206, 955 P.2d at 797 (citing Douchette, 117 Wash. 2d at 812, 818
P.2d at 1365).
164. Rekhter v. Dep’t of Social and Health Servs., 180 Wash. 2d 102, 150, 323 P. 3d 1036, 1059
(Stephens, J., dissenting) (citing Leschner v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 27 Wash. 2d 911, 926, 185
P.2d 113, 121–22 (1947)).
165. Douchette, 117 Wash. 2d at 813, 818 P.2d at 1365 (citing Hosogai v. Kadota, 700 P.2d 1327
(Ariz. 1985)).
166. Stevens v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 2010 MT 282, ¶ 33, 358 Mont. 474, 247 P.3d 244.
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We find support for this assertion in Ames v. Department of Labor &
Industries,167 a landmark Washington case on equitable tolling. There, the
Supreme Court of Washington tolled the statute of limitations for a
workman’s claim because the claimant was mentally incapacitated during
the limitations period.168 The Court recognized that the legislature “has
always been well advised of the uses and the purposes of equity,” which
“relieve[s] under special circumstances from the harshness of strict legal
rules.”169 On those facts, the Court concluded that a strict application of
the statute of limitations would be contrary to public policy and legislative
intent.170 We argue that our approach serves similar goals: equitable
tolling would promote good public policy by preserving valid claims and
incentivizing the pursuit of administrative remedies, and it would serve
the legislative intent behind limitations periods by giving notice to
defendants and avoiding stale claims.
C.

The Supreme Court of Washington Has Recognized the Tension
Between Exhaustion and Statutes of Limitation

Although no Washington court has explicitly applied equitable tolling
in the exhaustion context, the Supreme Court of Washington has invoked
an equitable analysis to allow a claim that would have otherwise been
barred by the statute of limitations.171 In Valley View, the plaintiff property
developer failed to appeal the City’s denial of his permit applications
within 30 days as provided by city code.172 The Court rejected the City’s
argument that the statute of limitations barred relief, reasoning that the
plaintiff believed in good faith, based on the City’s representations, that it
had a vested right to develop its property.173 The plaintiff pursued
administrative relief in reliance on the City’s assurances and sought
judicial review once the City issued its final denial.174 Without expressly
conducting an equitable tolling analysis, the Court found the plaintiff did
not lose its right to obtain relief “simply because it took more than 30 days

167. 176 Wash. 509, 30 P.2d 239 (1934).
168. Id. at 513–14.
169. Id. at 513.
170. Id.
171. See Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621, 632, 733 P.2d 182, 189
(1987).
172. Id. at 629, 631, 733 P.2d at 189.
173. Id. at 629, 632, 733 P.2d at 187–89.
174. Id. at 632, 733 P.2d at 189.
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to seek some accommodation from the City.”175 Valley View demonstrates
the justice of applying equitable tolling in appropriate circumstances, as
well as the Court’s willingness to do so.
In CMS, the Court more explicitly addressed the relationship between
the administrative process and statutes of limitation. CMS was a dispute
over taxes the plaintiff alleged it mistakenly paid to the City of
Lakewood.176 The plaintiff sought repayment of taxes paid outside of the
three-year limitations period, but the trial court ruled that the statute of
limitations barred recovery.177 The plaintiff then attempted to recover
those taxes by seeking a writ of mandamus to force the City to respond to
its corresponding refund claim.178 The Court disapproved of this tactic:
CMS seeks mandamus for the express purpose of reaching back
beyond the legal statute of limitations. We do not think the statute
of limitations can be overcome by such a use of the administrative
process. Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that CMS
cannot choose first to pursue recovery through the courts and then
attempt to bypass the statute of limitations that necessarily applies
as a result of that choice by seeking relief through the
administrative process.179
One might argue that this holding signals disapproval of the approach
advocated here. We disagree. Importantly, the issue in CMS was not
equitable tolling of a claim after a plaintiff diligently pursues
administrative remedies. Instead, the question was whether the plaintiff
could use the administrative process to circumvent the statute of
limitations and revive stale claims after receiving an adverse ruling from
the court. Thus, factually speaking, CMS is inapposite. Moreover, like our
proposal, the CMS holding demonstrates respect for the timely and
appropriate pursuit of claims.180 Unlike the writ of mandamus in that case,
equitable tolling of a timely pursued claim is not a work-around.

175. Id.
176. See Cost Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 178 Wash. 2d 635, 638, 310 P.3d 804, 806
(2013).
177. Id. at 640, 310 P.3d at 807.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 652, 310 P.3d at 813.
180. See id. at 651–52, 310 P.3d at 813 (“[The plaintiff] sought mandamus only after the trial court
informed it that its recovery in superior court was constrained by the three year statute of limitations.
In essence, CMS seeks to use the administrative process to revive a claim otherwise barred by the
three year statute of limitations.”).
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Equitable Tolling Is Consistent with Existing Washington
Precedent

The issue of equitable tolling and administrative remedies also arose in
Rekhter v. Department of Social and Health Services.181 In that case, the
plaintiffs brought suit challenging determinations made by the
Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS), but failed to do so
within the 90 days required by statute.182 The trial court concluded that
equitable tolling of the deadline was justified by the plaintiffs’
vulnerability and the nature of the administrative appeal process.183 Upon
review by the Supreme Court of Washington, the majority did not reach
this issue. However, the dissent criticized the trial judge for reaching a
“conclusion [that] would completely eviscerate the statute of
limitations . . . for each and every DSHS client.”184
While this opinion is not binding, we find it helpful to explain how it
is also consistent with our proposal. Unlike a plaintiff who timely and
diligently exhausts administrative remedies, the plaintiffs in Rekhter sat
on their claims far beyond the statutory time limit.185 The dissent reasoned
that this ran afoul of the legislature’s intent to limit the state’s exposure to
liability.186 What we propose would not implicate these concerns. The
pursuit of administrative remedies notifies a defendant of a claim, and
tolling still sets a fixed time period for liability, but does so without
leaving the plaintiff at the mercy of the administrative process.
Finally, we note that our proposal does not contradict the Supreme
Court of Washington’s recently expressed “reluctan[ce] to apply
exceptions to legislative time limits”187 or to extend equitable tolling
standards “beyond the traditional standard.”188 Notably, these sentiments
were both articulated in the personal restraint petition (PRP) context,
which implicates specific policies that apply to collateral attacks of
criminal convictions.189 The Court also recognized that RCW 10.73.100
181. 180 Wash. 2d 102, 323 P.3d 1036 (2014).
182. Id. at 149, 323 P.3d at 1059 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 150–51, 323 P.3d at 1059–60 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 153, 323 P.3d at 1061 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
185. See id. at 109, 323 P.3d at 1039–40 (suit brought in 2007 challenging determinations made as
early as April 2003).
186. Id. at 149–50, 323 P.3d at 1059–60 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
187. In re Bonds, 165 Wash. 2d 135, 143, 196 P.3d 672, 677 (2008).
188. In re Haghighi, 178 Wash. 2d 435, 447–48, 309 P.3d 459, 465–66 (2013).
189. Those policies include undermining the finality of convictions, which would prevent a
prisoner from obtaining federal habeas corpus relief. See Haghighi, 178 Wash. 2d at 448, 309 P.3d at
465–66; Bonds, 165 Wash. 2d at 143, 196 P.3d at 677.
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provides petitioners with multiple grounds for tolling the statute of
limitations, such as newly discovered evidence, facial invalidity of the
judgment and sentence, and double jeopardy violations.190 The Court
distinguished this from other “normal” contexts, where “equitable tolling
might be the only way in which a party is not deprived of his or her
remedy.”191 Exhaustion of administrative remedies is one of those
“normal” contexts in which equitable tolling may be the only device by
which to preserve a valid claim.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of administrative exhaustion does not apply to every
claim, but it can have severe results when it does. Plaintiffs should exhaust
their administrative remedies when required because courts excuse the
failure to exhaust only in exceedingly rare circumstances. Yet, when
exhaustion is a prerequisite to judicial review, the attendant delay can
result in the statute of limitations barring just relief, either in whole or in
part. To preserve the integrity of the administrative process and ensure
that plaintiffs are made whole when pursuing valid claims, we propose
that Washington courts equitably toll the statute of limitations while a
plaintiff pursues administrative remedies.

190. Haghighi, 178 Wash. 2d at 448, 309 P.3d at 466.
191. Id.

